aiding abetting counselling procuring definition

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Aiding abetting counselling procuring definition

Causation is vital: Attorney General's Reference No. While causation is vital, the procuring need not be the sole or decisive reason why P committed the offence. It is sufficient if it played some part in P's decision to commit the offence. In some circumstances the procuring need not be known to P. For example, D laces P's drinks and P, unaware of what has happened, drives his vehicle with excess alcohol.

Aiding means providing assistance or giving support to P and there must be actual assistance. For example, D sends P a torch to use in the commission of a burglary. Before it arrives P leaves to commit the offence. P need not be aware of the assistance provided he is in fact assisted. For example, P intends to kill V. D prevents Y from warning V of the danger. In the case of aiding, it is not necessary to prove that P was aware of D's contribution to the offence.

For example, D knows that P intends to assault V. D meets V and sends him in P's direction. Abetting means to incite by aid, to investigate or encourage. Encouragement must have the capacity to act on P's mind and therefore P must be aware of D's encouragement. D is not guilty as a secondary party. However, D would be liable if P heard what he had said and even if it made no difference to his course of action; because he had already made up his mind to assault V.

Counselling involves the provision of advice or information and encompasses urging someone to commit an offence. Voluntary presence at the scene of a crime may be capable of constituting encouragement but in such a case D must intend that his presence should encourage P, and P must in fact be encouraged by D's presence: Coney 8 Q.

In Wilcox v. Jeffrey [] 1 All E. There is no general duty in English law to prevent crime although a citizen has a duty, if called upon, to assist a constable to prevent a breach of the peace: R v. As a matter of general principle the criminal law is reluctant to impose liability for omissions as this has the potential to widen the scope of liability to an exorbitant degree.

Consistent with this general rule an omission to act does not ordinarily fix D with secondary liability. In the case of i above, failure to discharge the duty is capable of constituting assistance or encouragement. For example, D, a security guard omits to keep watch on his premises which are burgled by P. In the case of ii above, failure to exercise the entitlement may render D liable for an offence that P commits as a result. For example, D owns a car in which he is travelling as a passenger.

P, the driver, drives dangerously. D is also guilty of dangerous driving. It should be noted that the precise scope of this exception to the general rule is unclear. The fault element of secondary liability is notoriously complicated. This is because D's state of mind must relate to what he himself does and what he knows about P that is P's conduct and state of mind. This means that it is necessary to consider:. Suppose D is a shopkeeper. D sells P a hammer.

P uses the hammer to assault V. D has done an act which contributed to assisted the commission of the assault. Is D guilty as a secondary party? It depends. If D had no idea that P would use the hammer to assault V, D is not implicated in P's conduct and is not guilty as a secondary party. But, what would the prosecution be required to prove to establish D's guilt? The first aspect of the fault element is that D must intend the act of assistance or encouragement. It is the assistance or encouragement that must be intended, not the ultimate crime.

For example, D may hand P a jemmy knowing that P intends to use it to commit a burglary. D may hope that P changes his mind but this is irrelevant. It was because of the potential scope of liability that Professor Glanville Williams argued for an exception from liability for shopkeepers. This was on the basis that the seller of an ordinary marketable commodity should not be his buyer's keeper in the criminal law. In the ' mere presence ' type of case the prosecution must also prove that D intended to assist or encourage P, in the sense of acting to do so: R v.

Coney 8 Q. The prosecution must prove that D believed that his conduct has the capacity to assist or encourage P although some of the cases suggest that D's belief must be that his conduct is encouraging to P. Procuring is a special case because it requires D to endeavour to cause the commission of the offence. In Johnson v. Youden [] 1 K. It is therefore necessary to establish what is meant by the " essential matters " and what is meant by " know.

In their report on secondary participation, the Law Commission concluded that the essential matters are fourfold:. D must " know " that P is going to do an act which satisfies the conduct element of the offence but not necessarily the details of the act. D must " know " of the circumstances necessary to constitute the offence. For example, D sells P a hammer believing that P will use it to cause damage to property belonging to P.

One circumstance that must be present in the offence of criminal damage is that the property belongs to another person. If P uses the hammer to damage property belonging to V, D is not guilty, as a secondary party, to P's offence of causing criminal damage. As a general rule D must " know " the consequence element of the offence. But an exception arises if the principal's liability for the consequence is ' constructive.

Both D and P intend to cause V only minor harm. P hits V and V falls over and dies. So too is D. D must " know " that P will act with the fault element required in relation to the principal offence. For example, D assists P to appropriate property belonging to another. P does so dishonestly and with an intention permanently to deprive that other person of the property.

D is guilty as a secondary party if he ' knew ' that P would act with that state of mind. The Law Commission concluded that the requirement of knowledge is satisfied if D knows or believes that:. P is doing or will do so in the circumstances and with the consequences, proof of which is required for conviction of the offence. As the Law Commission noted, despite what was said by Lord Goddard in Johnson and Youden and despite the fact that that case was approved by the House of Lords on two occasions, there are decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal which appear to dilute the requirement of knowledge.

These cases provide some support for four possible tests:. D must foresee the risk of a strong possibility that P will commit the offence: R v. Reardon [] CLR ;. D must contemplate the risk of a real possibility that P will commit the offence: R v. D must foresee that it is likely that P will commit the offence: R v.

It is debateable as to whether these cases are a safe guide to the fault requirement. First, they are inconsistent with Johnson and Youden. Secondly, they are inconsistent with each other. Thirdly, they rely on cases of joint venture, where the principles of liability appear to be different.

Finally, the statements concerning liability were not essential to the Court's conclusion. Taken at face value, Lord Goddard's statement in Johnson and Youden requires ' knowledge ' of the essential matters. This requirement would ordinarily be satisfied if D believed that a fact exists or, in the case of future facts, that D believes they will exist.

D may also be held to know a fact where he deliberately shuts his eyes to the obvious and refrains from enquiry. In a case of wilful blindness, D is treated as having actual knowledge because he has intentionally chosen not to inquire on the basis that it is folly to be wise.

The issue of the fault element in secondary participation will have to be considered by the courts at some point. At the moment there is a conflict in the authorities and there is a potential for the net of criminal liability to be widened to an excessive degree. There is one authority which appears to suggest that law enforcement officials will not be liable if they participate in an offence already laid on in order to mitigate the consequence of an offence: R v.

Birtles [] 2 All E. And in Williams v. Director of Public Prosecutions 98 Cr. These authorities appear to be inconsistent with Yip Chiu-Cheng [] 1 A. The common law principles relating to secondary party liability must now be read together with the Serious Crime Act , which came into effect on 1 st October The Act abolished the common law offence of incitement which imposed liability in respect of conduct by D that encouraged P to commit an offence. This was an inchoate offence and liability was not derivative.

Provided D satisfied the fault element of the offence, he was liable as soon as the encouragement came to P's attention. If P was in fact encouraged and went on to commit the offence, D was guilty of the offence as an accessory. At common law, incitement involved encouraging another person or group of persons to commit an offence. It was necessary to show that the encouragement had come to the attention of the intended recipient but it was not necessary to prove that anyone was in fact encouraged although D could be convicted of attempting to incite, provided that the offence incited was triable on indictment.

The fault element of incitement involved two elements. First, that D's purpose was that P should commit the principal offence. Secondly, that D knew of the circumstances of the act incited which were elements of the crime in question. Prosecutions may still be brought at common law in respect of any acts of incitement committed wholly or partly before 1 st October In respect of each offence, the prosecution must prove that D did an act that was capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence or offences.

It is immaterial whether any anticipated offence is ever committed and it does not matter whether anyone was in fact assisted or encouraged. D's act may take a number of different forms, including a course of conduct or a failure to discharge a duty. By reason of section 52 and Schedule 4 an act committed abroad may suffice if certain jurisdictional requirements are satisfied, as may an act in England and Wales that is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence abroad.

In the case of section 44, D must specifically intend to encourage or assist the commission of the anticipated offence. This requires the prosecution to prove:. D intended to encourage or assist the doing of an act which would amount to the commission of an offence;.

If the offence is one requiring proof of fault, that D intended that the act would be done with that fault or was reckless as to whether or not it would be done with that fault or D's state of mind was such that were he to do it, it would be done with that fault; and. If the offence is one requiring proof of particular circumstances or consequences, that D believed that the act would be done in those circumstances or with those consequences or was reckless as to whether or not it would be done in those circumstances or with those consequences.

In the case of section 45, the offence is committed if D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence and he believes that the offence will be committed and that his act will encourage its commission. The mens rea or fault element is similar to the offence under section 44, save that it is sufficient if D believes that an offence will be committed.

In the case of section 46, the offence is committed if: i D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of one or more criminal offences and he believes that one or more of those offences will be committed but has no belief as to which ; and ii that his act will encourage or assist the commission of one or more of them. The mens rea or fault element is similar to the offence under section Section 46 is intended to deal with the situation where D knowingly provides assistance or encouragement without knowing the precise details of the offence.

For example, D provides P with a gun believing that it will be used either to commit a robbery or to commit a murder. Section 52 1 provides that if D knows or believes that the criminal offence he anticipates might take place wholly or partly in England or Wales, he may be guilty of an offence under section 44, 45 or 46 no matter where he was at the relevant time.

If it is not proved that D knew or believed that what he anticipates might take place wholly or partly in England and Wales, he is not guilty of an offence unless certain conditions apply. These conditions, in summary, are as follows:. D acts wholly or partly in England and Wales and the act he anticipates would still be punishable under English law, even if committed abroad.

D acts wholly or partly in England and Wales and the act he anticipates would be an offence under the law applicable in the place where the act is to take place. D would himself be liable to prosecution under English law if he were to commit the anticipated offences in the place or country in question.

Section 50 contains a defence of acting reasonably. It is a defence for an accused to prove that, at the time that he did the act which was capable of encouraging or assisting another person to commit an offence, he knew or believed, on reasonable grounds, that certain circumstances existed in respect of which it was reasonable for him to act as he did.

Page vii. English criminal law. Lesser included offences Concurrence Ignorantia juris non excusat. Encouraging or assisting a crime Conspiracy Accessory Attempt Common purpose. Self-defence Duress Necessity Loss of control Consent inc. Rape Sexual assault Sexual Offences Act Riot Violent disorder Affray Unlawful assembly Fear or provocation of violence Harassment, alarm or distress intent aggravates Public Order Act Incitement to ethnic or racial hatred Nuisance Causing Public nuisance Outraging public decency Effecting a public mischief Keeping a disorderly house Preventing the lawful burial of a body Breach of the peace Rout Forcible entry Accessory legal term Misconduct in a public office Misfeasance in public office Abuse of authority Perjury of oath Dereliction of duty.

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State ex rel Juv. Holloway, Or App , P2d ; State v. Anlauf, Or App , P2d Bargas-Perez, Or App , P2d Wilson, Or App , P3d 10 State ex rel Juvenile Dept. ORS A person is criminally liable for the conduct of another person constituting a crime if: 1 The person is made criminally liable by the statute defining the crime; or 2 With the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime the person: a Solicits or commands such other person to commit the crime; or b Aids or abets or agrees or attempts to aid or abet such other person in planning or committing the crime; or c Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the crime, fails to make an effort the person is legally required to make.

Hasan, 93 Or App , P2d Acquiescence alone is not sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting. One - that someone committed the offence of NOO. Throughout these directions, I will call the person who committed that offence the " principal offender ". Two - that the accused knew of, or believed in, the essential circumstances needed to establish NOO. Three - that the accused intentionally assisted or encouraged the principal offender to commit NOO.

If withdrawal is relevant, add the following shaded section. Before you can find NOA guilty of NOO by counselling or procuring, you must be satisfied that the prosecution has proven all of these elements beyond reasonable doubt. The first element that the prosecution must prove is that someone committed the offence of NOO. In this case, this requires you to be satisfied that all of the following matters have been proven beyond reasonable doubt:.

The second element that the prosecution must prove is that NOA knew all the essential circumstances needed to establish the offence of NOO, or believed that those essential circumstances existed. The "essential circumstances" that are needed to establish NOO are the [ insert number ] matters that I just explained to you in relation to the first element.

So for this second element to be met, NOA must have known or believed that:. The prosecution alleged that NOA had the necessary knowledge or belief. The third element that the prosecution must prove is that the accused intentionally assisted or encouraged the principal offender to commit NOO.

In this case, it is alleged that NOA did this by what is called "counselling or procuring". This can be done by words, action or both. A person can counsel or procure someone to commit an offence even if that other person already intended to commit that offence. This does not mean that you have to find that NOA intended [ describe the relevant result — e.

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P, the driver, drives dangerously. D is also guilty of dangerous driving. It should be noted that the precise scope of this exception to the general rule is unclear. The fault element of secondary liability is notoriously complicated. This is because D's state of mind must relate to what he himself does and what he knows about P that is P's conduct and state of mind. This means that it is necessary to consider:. Suppose D is a shopkeeper.

D sells P a hammer. P uses the hammer to assault V. D has done an act which contributed to assisted the commission of the assault. Is D guilty as a secondary party? It depends. If D had no idea that P would use the hammer to assault V, D is not implicated in P's conduct and is not guilty as a secondary party.

But, what would the prosecution be required to prove to establish D's guilt? The first aspect of the fault element is that D must intend the act of assistance or encouragement. It is the assistance or encouragement that must be intended, not the ultimate crime. For example, D may hand P a jemmy knowing that P intends to use it to commit a burglary. D may hope that P changes his mind but this is irrelevant. It was because of the potential scope of liability that Professor Glanville Williams argued for an exception from liability for shopkeepers.

This was on the basis that the seller of an ordinary marketable commodity should not be his buyer's keeper in the criminal law. In the ' mere presence ' type of case the prosecution must also prove that D intended to assist or encourage P, in the sense of acting to do so: R v. Coney 8 Q. The prosecution must prove that D believed that his conduct has the capacity to assist or encourage P although some of the cases suggest that D's belief must be that his conduct is encouraging to P.

Procuring is a special case because it requires D to endeavour to cause the commission of the offence. In Johnson v. Youden [] 1 K. It is therefore necessary to establish what is meant by the " essential matters " and what is meant by " know.

In their report on secondary participation, the Law Commission concluded that the essential matters are fourfold:. D must " know " that P is going to do an act which satisfies the conduct element of the offence but not necessarily the details of the act. D must " know " of the circumstances necessary to constitute the offence.

For example, D sells P a hammer believing that P will use it to cause damage to property belonging to P. One circumstance that must be present in the offence of criminal damage is that the property belongs to another person. If P uses the hammer to damage property belonging to V, D is not guilty, as a secondary party, to P's offence of causing criminal damage.

As a general rule D must " know " the consequence element of the offence. But an exception arises if the principal's liability for the consequence is ' constructive. Both D and P intend to cause V only minor harm. P hits V and V falls over and dies. So too is D. D must " know " that P will act with the fault element required in relation to the principal offence. For example, D assists P to appropriate property belonging to another. P does so dishonestly and with an intention permanently to deprive that other person of the property.

D is guilty as a secondary party if he ' knew ' that P would act with that state of mind. The Law Commission concluded that the requirement of knowledge is satisfied if D knows or believes that:. P is doing or will do so in the circumstances and with the consequences, proof of which is required for conviction of the offence. As the Law Commission noted, despite what was said by Lord Goddard in Johnson and Youden and despite the fact that that case was approved by the House of Lords on two occasions, there are decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal which appear to dilute the requirement of knowledge.

These cases provide some support for four possible tests:. D must foresee the risk of a strong possibility that P will commit the offence: R v. Reardon [] CLR ;. D must contemplate the risk of a real possibility that P will commit the offence: R v. D must foresee that it is likely that P will commit the offence: R v.

It is debateable as to whether these cases are a safe guide to the fault requirement. First, they are inconsistent with Johnson and Youden. Secondly, they are inconsistent with each other. Thirdly, they rely on cases of joint venture, where the principles of liability appear to be different. Finally, the statements concerning liability were not essential to the Court's conclusion. Taken at face value, Lord Goddard's statement in Johnson and Youden requires ' knowledge ' of the essential matters.

This requirement would ordinarily be satisfied if D believed that a fact exists or, in the case of future facts, that D believes they will exist. D may also be held to know a fact where he deliberately shuts his eyes to the obvious and refrains from enquiry. In a case of wilful blindness, D is treated as having actual knowledge because he has intentionally chosen not to inquire on the basis that it is folly to be wise.

The issue of the fault element in secondary participation will have to be considered by the courts at some point. At the moment there is a conflict in the authorities and there is a potential for the net of criminal liability to be widened to an excessive degree. There is one authority which appears to suggest that law enforcement officials will not be liable if they participate in an offence already laid on in order to mitigate the consequence of an offence: R v.

Birtles [] 2 All E. And in Williams v. Director of Public Prosecutions 98 Cr. These authorities appear to be inconsistent with Yip Chiu-Cheng [] 1 A. The common law principles relating to secondary party liability must now be read together with the Serious Crime Act , which came into effect on 1 st October The Act abolished the common law offence of incitement which imposed liability in respect of conduct by D that encouraged P to commit an offence.

This was an inchoate offence and liability was not derivative. Provided D satisfied the fault element of the offence, he was liable as soon as the encouragement came to P's attention. If P was in fact encouraged and went on to commit the offence, D was guilty of the offence as an accessory. At common law, incitement involved encouraging another person or group of persons to commit an offence. It was necessary to show that the encouragement had come to the attention of the intended recipient but it was not necessary to prove that anyone was in fact encouraged although D could be convicted of attempting to incite, provided that the offence incited was triable on indictment.

The fault element of incitement involved two elements. First, that D's purpose was that P should commit the principal offence. Secondly, that D knew of the circumstances of the act incited which were elements of the crime in question. Prosecutions may still be brought at common law in respect of any acts of incitement committed wholly or partly before 1 st October In respect of each offence, the prosecution must prove that D did an act that was capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence or offences.

It is immaterial whether any anticipated offence is ever committed and it does not matter whether anyone was in fact assisted or encouraged. D's act may take a number of different forms, including a course of conduct or a failure to discharge a duty. By reason of section 52 and Schedule 4 an act committed abroad may suffice if certain jurisdictional requirements are satisfied, as may an act in England and Wales that is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence abroad.

In the case of section 44, D must specifically intend to encourage or assist the commission of the anticipated offence. This requires the prosecution to prove:. D intended to encourage or assist the doing of an act which would amount to the commission of an offence;. If the offence is one requiring proof of fault, that D intended that the act would be done with that fault or was reckless as to whether or not it would be done with that fault or D's state of mind was such that were he to do it, it would be done with that fault; and.

If the offence is one requiring proof of particular circumstances or consequences, that D believed that the act would be done in those circumstances or with those consequences or was reckless as to whether or not it would be done in those circumstances or with those consequences. In the case of section 45, the offence is committed if D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence and he believes that the offence will be committed and that his act will encourage its commission.

The mens rea or fault element is similar to the offence under section 44, save that it is sufficient if D believes that an offence will be committed. In the case of section 46, the offence is committed if: i D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of one or more criminal offences and he believes that one or more of those offences will be committed but has no belief as to which ; and ii that his act will encourage or assist the commission of one or more of them.

The mens rea or fault element is similar to the offence under section Section 46 is intended to deal with the situation where D knowingly provides assistance or encouragement without knowing the precise details of the offence. For example, D provides P with a gun believing that it will be used either to commit a robbery or to commit a murder.

Section 52 1 provides that if D knows or believes that the criminal offence he anticipates might take place wholly or partly in England or Wales, he may be guilty of an offence under section 44, 45 or 46 no matter where he was at the relevant time. If it is not proved that D knew or believed that what he anticipates might take place wholly or partly in England and Wales, he is not guilty of an offence unless certain conditions apply.

These conditions, in summary, are as follows:. D acts wholly or partly in England and Wales and the act he anticipates would still be punishable under English law, even if committed abroad. D acts wholly or partly in England and Wales and the act he anticipates would be an offence under the law applicable in the place where the act is to take place. D would himself be liable to prosecution under English law if he were to commit the anticipated offences in the place or country in question.

Section 50 contains a defence of acting reasonably. It is a defence for an accused to prove that, at the time that he did the act which was capable of encouraging or assisting another person to commit an offence, he knew or believed, on reasonable grounds, that certain circumstances existed in respect of which it was reasonable for him to act as he did. By section 50 2 it is also a defence if D acts reasonably but on the basis of a reasonable mistake of fact.

In other words, it may be reasonable for D to act as he did in circumstances as he believed them to be. The factors to be considered in determining whether it was reasonable for D to act as he did include the seriousness of the anticipated offence, any purpose for which he claims to have been acting or any authority by which he claims to have been acting. The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter.

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To print this article, all you need is to be registered or login on Mondaq. There are three important points to note about section 8: i. D's state of mind in relation to his own act of assistance or encouragement; ii. D's state of mind in relation to the commission of the principal offence by P. P is committing or will commit the conduct element of the offence; ii.

Reardon [] CLR ; iii. D intended to encourage or assist the doing of an act which would amount to the commission of an offence; ii. If the offence is one requiring proof of fault, that D intended that the act would be done with that fault or was reckless as to whether or not it would be done with that fault or D's state of mind was such that were he to do it, it would be done with that fault; and iii.

David Perry. UK Criminal Law Crime. In this edition of the UK Enforcement newsletter, we provide an update on recent anti-corruption and fraud developments, as well as other economic crime issues in the UK. Some issues are obvious, such as the devastating impact of the pandemic on the economy and rising unemployment, both of which are inevitably resulting. The UK Bribery Act has brought in significant changes to anticorruption law, replacing the previous bribery laws.

Sign Up for our free News Alerts - All the latest articles on your chosen topics condensed into a free bi-weekly email. Register For News Alerts. Article Tags. FEB It consolidated statutory English criminal law related to accomplices , including many classes of encouragers inciters.

Mainly its offences were, according to the draftsman of the Act, [3] replacement enactments with little or no variation in phraseology. It was passed with the object of simplifying the law. It collected the relevant parts of Peel's Acts and the equivalent Irish Acts and others. The Act provides that an accessory to an indictable offence shall be treated in the same way as if he had committed the offence:.

Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender. Section 10 states that the Act does not apply to Scotland. The active section thus applies to England, Northern Ireland and Wales. The rest of the Act was repealed by the Criminal Law Act to make easier the abolition of the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours ; see below.

The Act does not apply to summary offences , but section 44 1 of the Magistrates' Courts Act is to the like effect:. A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission by another person of a summary offence shall be guilty of the like offence Section 11 was repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

United Kingdom legislation. Parliament of the United Kingdom.

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What does aiding, abetting, inciting or attempting Money Laundering actually mean? See the definitions in UK law here…. Victorian sounding phraseology that relates to how a person can become culpable for the actions of a principal offender. It can be just as severe. That too is a method of being complicit in even an impossible to commit crime.

It is a well understood and used aspect of criminal law by prosecutors. It goes right back to when an act of parliament created the Accessories and Abettors act. Due to offences within that act being obsolete nowadays, the Criminal Law Act of was established. In R v Betts and Ridley it was found that a person need not be actually present at the time of the commission of an offence to be culpable for it. That, alongside the 6AMLD from the EU caters for mobile devices being used in one jurisdiction while the actual criminality resides in another, even when the evidence is on a server in a third.

Just using a mobile device to send a text, email, telephone call or other communication can render you culpable nowadays. No one else had had any contact with the child on the fateful day, so one or other of the defendants must have been responsible. Instead, they were both convicted under s 5 of the Act.

Meanwhile, if it can be proved that D, being one of two or more parties to a crime, must have been guilty as either principal or accessory, then he may be convicted. D appealed on the ground that, if the prosecution could not prove whether he had murdered V himself or someone else had done it, he was entitled to an acquittal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Provided, in either case, that D had the requisite actus reus and mens rea as principal, this is causing death with intent to kill or cause really serious injury; for secondary parties, see below , then it did not matter whether he had killed her himself or encouraged another to do so.

So if D, an adult, employs his eight-year-old son to break in to houses and steal, the child is an innocent agent, and the father liable as principal. An example comes from the case of Cogan and Leak QB L terrorised his wife into having sex with another man, C. The Court of Appeal also considered, obiter , that L may alternatively have committed the offence as principal through the doctrine of an innocent agency.

It should also be noted that it is possible for a secondary party to be held liable for committing an offence which they could not commit as principal. The Court of Appeal has held that the words should simply bear their ordinary meaning. We approach the section on the basis also that if four ordinary words are employed here — aid, abet, counsel or procure — the probability is that there is a difference between each of those four words and the other three, because, if there were no such difference, then Parliament would be wasting time in using four words where two or three would do.

There is considerable overlap between the four words, and it is quite possible for D to participate in more than one way. As indicated above, this means to provide some assistance before or during the commission of a crime by the principal. E had killed two men who were twin brothers with a baseball bat, while D guarded the door to the room where the attack took place. D appealed, unsuccessfully, to the Privy Council. The commission of most criminal offences, and certainly most offences of violence, may be assisted by the forbidding presence of another as back-up and support.

The threshold of involvement is very low. Although it is not essential for D to be present at the scene of the crime if charged with aiding, it seems that it is essential for abetting. A remarkable example of abetting is provided by the recent Supreme Court case of Gnango A young woman, Magda Pniewska, was caught in the crossfire and killed — shot once in the head by Bandana Man.

Gnango was subsequently convicted of the attempted murder of Bandana Man and the murder of Magda, on the basis of joint enterprise. He successfully appealed against his murder conviction to the Court of Appeal, but the prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court.

That court, sitting with seven judges, allowed the appeal, and reinstated the murder conviction — not on the basis of joint enterprise, but on the basis of secondary liability. Bandana Man, meanwhile, was attempting to murder Gnango, but inadvertently shot Magda.

Through the application of transferred malice, this would have made Bandana Man guilty of her murder. Lord Phillips explained his reasoning as follows:. Under the doctrine of transferred malice he was guilty of her murder. A number of cases have raised the issue whether mere presence at the scene of the crime as opposed to presence combined with some actions: shouting, gesticulating, etc will suffice for the actus reus of abetting.

In Coney and others 8 QBD , three onlookers at an illegal bare-knuckle fight were convicted of abetting assault. The Court of Criminal Appeal quashed their convictions following misdirections to the jury. The court held that, although presence alone may suffice for the actus reus , it must be combined with the culpable mental element for it to amount to the offence of abetting. Hawkins J said:. In the latter case he aids and abets, in the former he does not.

It is no criminal offence to stand by, a mere passive spectator of a crime … But the fact that a person was voluntarily and purposely present witnessing the commission of a crime and offered no opposition to it … or at least to express his dissent might under some circumstances afford cogent evidence upon which a jury would be justified in finding that he wilfully encouraged and so aided and abetted.

There have been a number of cases since. The law now is that D may be guilty of abetting via presence alone if:. His presence provided encouragement in fact. He intended to provide encouragement through his presence. In Allan 1 QB , there was no actual encouragement in fact.

D was present at an affray. The Court of Appeal quashed his conviction of abetting a public order offence. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to convicting D for his thoughts alone. Meanwhile, in Clarkson and others 1 WLR , there was no evidence of an intention to encourage. The appellants were soldiers at a British Army barracks in Germany who had witnessed the gang rape by at least three soldiers of an year-old girl.

Other soldiers had clearly aided and abetted the rape by holding the girl down, but there was no evidence that two of the appellants did anything other than just watch. Wilcox v Jeffrey 1 All ER Coleman Hawkins, a famous American saxophonist, appeared at a concert in London, iillegally the terms of his entry into the UK being that he did not take up employment.

D was the owner of a magazine, Jazz Illustrated , who had met Hawkins at the airport, jattended the concert and then written a very positive review of the concert in the jmagazine. If D has knowledge of the actions of the principal, plus the duty or right to control them, but deliberately chooses not to, then he may be guilty of aiding or abetting by omission.

In Du Cros v Lambourne 1 KB 40 and Rubie v Faulkner 1 KB , the defendants were the owners of cars who had allowed the principal to drive their cars carelessly, while they sat in the passenger seat. Both defendants were convicted of abetting road traffic offences. Presence in the vehicle, combined with at least the right to tell the driver what to do, was sufficient for liability.

D, a pub landlord, had failed to get late drinkers out of his pub after closing time. D was con-victed of aiding and abetting three customers to consume intoxicating liquor out of licensed hours, contrary to the Licensing Act His presence in the pub combined with his failure to take steps to ensure the drinkers drank up and left on time was enough for liability.

D was convicted of abetting his friend, E, in causing death by dangerous driving. V, a rear seat passenger, was thrown out of the car and killed. E pleaded guilty to the substantive offence and D, who had pleaded not guilty, was convicted of abetting him by allowing him to drive his car, when E was obviously drunk. The Court of Appeal held that the crucial issue was whether D had an opportunity to intervene once he realised because of the speed at which he was going that E was driving dangerously.

In Martin EWCA Crim , D was convicted of aiding and abetting a learner driver, E, to commit the offence of causing death by dangerous driving. E and a passenger were killed.

NOTTS COUNTY VS OLDHAM BETTING EXPERT NBA

The principal is the person or persons who commit the actus reus of the offence. There may be joint principals, for example, where P1 and P2 attack V. Secondary parties provide assistance or encouragement to the principal or principals. The starting point is section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act This provides that whoever shall aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any indictable offence shall be liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender.

Historically the position at common law was that aiders and abettors were said to be principals in the second degree and were actually or constructively present at the time the offence was committed by the principal.

By contrast, counsellors and procurers were accessories before the fact whose presence at the time of the offence was not necessary. The current position is that the four varieties of conduct overlap and they cover any form of assistance or encouragement. The position in relation to summary offences is governed by the Magistrates' Courts Act , section 44, which is in all material respects identical to section 8. It reflects the common law principle that aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring another person to commit an offence is not itself a distinct offence.

The secondary party is himself guilty of the offence committed by the principal and liable to the same penalties. It is the principal's offence for which D is liable. For example, D encourages P to murder V.

P stabs V intending to kill or cause serious bodily harm. Both D and P are guilty of murder and subject to the mandatory sentence of imprisonment for life. Secondary parties may be liable for P's crime even though they do not themselves satisfy the actus reus conduct element or mens rea fault element of P's offence.

It proceeds on the basis that the criminal liability of secondary parties is the same for every offence. Thus, while the definition of every offence will stipulate what the principal must do to incur liability, secondary liability is based on common law principles and applies to every offence. It collapses the distinction between perpetrators and other participants. This has obvious procedural and other evidential advantages. Amongst other things it enables the prosecution to obtain a conviction even if it cannot be proved whether D was acting as a principal or accessory.

For example, D1 and D2 are charged with bank robbery. They can be convicted even if it is not known who entered the bank and, using the threat of force, stole the money the principal and who drove the getaway car the accessory. It has been held by the Court of Appeal that there is no violation of Article 6 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights when the prosecution alleges that D is party to an offence but cannot specify his precise role: R v. Because the common law principle is that aiding and abetting etc.

This derivative aspect of secondary party liability was reflected in the old common law rule that before D could be liable as a secondary party it was necessary first to convict and sentence P. Thus, if P was not apprehended or died or was pardoned, D could not be tried. This is no longer the case. It is, however, necessary to prove that an offence was committed by P. If D encourages P to commit an offence, D incurs no liability at common law if, subsequently, P for whatever reason does not go on to commit or attempt to commit the offence.

For example, D supplies P with a torch knowing that P intends to use it in the course of a burglary. P decides not to commit the burglary. D is not guilty as a secondary party at common law. The position at common law is to be contrasted with offences under the Serious Crime Act These are inchoate offences committed by the offender as a principal, whether or not the encouraged crime occurs. The doctrine of innocent agency: where D uses an innocent agent to commit the offence.

In these circumstances D commits the offence as a principal and not as an accessory. For example, D uses a person who is insane, or under the age of criminal responsibility to commit an offence. The participation by the innocent agent is disregarded and D is treated as the principal. The secondary party's liability can exceed the liability of the principal where he procures the commission of the conduct element of the offence but his fault is greater than the principal's.

For example, D hands P a gun and tells P that it contains blank ammunition. D knows it contains live bullets. D encourages P to shoot at V in order to frighten V. P knows that V suffers from a serious heart condition. P shoots at and kills V with the live ammunition. P is guilty of manslaughter. D is guilty of murder: R v. Howe A. There is some question as to whether joint enterprise is a special case of secondary participation or merely a subset of aiding and abetting.

The Law Commission was of the view that it was the former Law Comm. There is a division of opinion among scholars on this point but the preponderance of opinion disagrees with the Law Commission. The essential differences between the two concepts are set out below. In the case of secondary liability there is no need for any agreement between D and P that P will go on to commit an offence. For example, D, a shopkeeper, sells P an article knowing that P will use it to commit burglary.

P uses the article to commit burglary. D is also guilty of burglary even though he may have hoped that P would not go on to commit the offence. Moreover, in ordinary cases of aiding and abetting, D must help or encourage the commission of the crime committed by P. In the case of joint enterprise liability, D and P embark on a joint venture to commit an offence, and, in the course of the joint venture, P commits another offence.

For example, D and P agree to commit burglary. If P commits the offence while D acts as a lookout, no difficulty arises. But what if P commits another offence which is in addition to or instead of the agreed offence? They are disturbed by the householder, V. D knows that P is armed with a knife. P uses the knife to stab and kill V. D is guilty of murder if he foresaw that P, as an incident of the joint venture might commit that offence: Chan Wing-Siu [] A.

The rationale for the joint enterprise liability rule is that D, by attaching himself to the venture to commit one offence, consciously accepts the risk that a co-adventurer might commit another offence. The inter-relationship between secondary participation and joint enterprise has not been the subject of detailed consideration by the courts but the issue may be resolved by the Supreme Court in R v. In that case D's conviction for murder was quashed by the Court of Appeal. D and D1 were involved in a gunfight.

The case for the Crown was that they were both involved in a joint enterprise to commit affray with foresight that murder might be committed. The Crown had conceded that there could be no joint enterprise on the basis of an agreement by D1 and D2 to shoot at each other.

The Court of Appeal questioned whether this concession was right and suggested that as a matter of policy the criminal law might require the imposition of liability in cases of duels between opposing persons. The reason why the law of secondary liability is so complicated is because it is necessary to consider the acts and state of mind of both D and P.

P may be guilty of an offence which requires proof of certain conduct coupled with any one of a number of fault elements intention, recklessness, maliciousness, negligence, knowledge, belief, suspicion. D as a secondary party is the person who with the requisite state of mind aids, abets, counsels or procures the principal offender to commit the offence. It follows that in D's case it is necessary to prove both a conduct element actus reus and fault element mens rea.

Procuring means to produce by endeavour. Causation is vital: Attorney General's Reference No. While causation is vital, the procuring need not be the sole or decisive reason why P committed the offence. It is sufficient if it played some part in P's decision to commit the offence. In some circumstances the procuring need not be known to P. For example, D laces P's drinks and P, unaware of what has happened, drives his vehicle with excess alcohol.

Aiding means providing assistance or giving support to P and there must be actual assistance. For example, D sends P a torch to use in the commission of a burglary. Before it arrives P leaves to commit the offence. P need not be aware of the assistance provided he is in fact assisted. For example, P intends to kill V.

D prevents Y from warning V of the danger. In the case of aiding, it is not necessary to prove that P was aware of D's contribution to the offence. For example, D knows that P intends to assault V. D meets V and sends him in P's direction. Abetting means to incite by aid, to investigate or encourage.

Encouragement must have the capacity to act on P's mind and therefore P must be aware of D's encouragement. D is not guilty as a secondary party. However, D would be liable if P heard what he had said and even if it made no difference to his course of action; because he had already made up his mind to assault V. Counselling involves the provision of advice or information and encompasses urging someone to commit an offence.

Voluntary presence at the scene of a crime may be capable of constituting encouragement but in such a case D must intend that his presence should encourage P, and P must in fact be encouraged by D's presence: Coney 8 Q. In Wilcox v. Jeffrey [] 1 All E. There is no general duty in English law to prevent crime although a citizen has a duty, if called upon, to assist a constable to prevent a breach of the peace: R v. As a matter of general principle the criminal law is reluctant to impose liability for omissions as this has the potential to widen the scope of liability to an exorbitant degree.

Consistent with this general rule an omission to act does not ordinarily fix D with secondary liability. In the case of i above, failure to discharge the duty is capable of constituting assistance or encouragement. For example, D, a security guard omits to keep watch on his premises which are burgled by P.

In the case of ii above, failure to exercise the entitlement may render D liable for an offence that P commits as a result. For example, D owns a car in which he is travelling as a passenger. P, the driver, drives dangerously. D is also guilty of dangerous driving. It should be noted that the precise scope of this exception to the general rule is unclear.

The fault element of secondary liability is notoriously complicated. This is because D's state of mind must relate to what he himself does and what he knows about P that is P's conduct and state of mind. This means that it is necessary to consider:. Suppose D is a shopkeeper. D sells P a hammer. P uses the hammer to assault V. D has done an act which contributed to assisted the commission of the assault.

Is D guilty as a secondary party? It depends. If D had no idea that P would use the hammer to assault V, D is not implicated in P's conduct and is not guilty as a secondary party. But, what would the prosecution be required to prove to establish D's guilt? The first aspect of the fault element is that D must intend the act of assistance or encouragement.

It is the assistance or encouragement that must be intended, not the ultimate crime. For example, D may hand P a jemmy knowing that P intends to use it to commit a burglary. D may hope that P changes his mind but this is irrelevant. It was because of the potential scope of liability that Professor Glanville Williams argued for an exception from liability for shopkeepers.

This was on the basis that the seller of an ordinary marketable commodity should not be his buyer's keeper in the criminal law. In the ' mere presence ' type of case the prosecution must also prove that D intended to assist or encourage P, in the sense of acting to do so: R v. Coney 8 Q. The prosecution must prove that D believed that his conduct has the capacity to assist or encourage P although some of the cases suggest that D's belief must be that his conduct is encouraging to P.

Mainly its offences were, according to the draftsman of the Act, [3] replacement enactments with little or no variation in phraseology. It was passed with the object of simplifying the law. It collected the relevant parts of Peel's Acts and the equivalent Irish Acts and others. The Act provides that an accessory to an indictable offence shall be treated in the same way as if he had committed the offence:. Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender.

Section 10 states that the Act does not apply to Scotland. The active section thus applies to England, Northern Ireland and Wales. The rest of the Act was repealed by the Criminal Law Act to make easier the abolition of the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours ; see below. The Act does not apply to summary offences , but section 44 1 of the Magistrates' Courts Act is to the like effect:.

A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission by another person of a summary offence shall be guilty of the like offence Section 11 was repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. United Kingdom legislation. Parliament of the United Kingdom. Page vii.

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What is PROCUREMENT Animated Explanation Definition and Example. - Procurement Meaning

The "essential circumstances" that are needed to establish NOO are or procuring, you must be encouraged the principal offender to to you in relation to beyond reasonable doubt. Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring alleged that Cryptocurrency mining calcium did this someone committed the offence of. In this case, aiding abetting counselling procuring definition requires driving after making a false to identity of driver etc. Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring Wilson, Or AppP3d 10 State ex rel Juvenile. Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring you to be satisfied that then failing to supply a than driving or attempting to. Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring prosecution must prove is that declaration about fitness when applying or procuring". Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring in charge of a vehicle while unfit through drink. PARAGRAPHBargas-Perez, Or AppP2d liable for the conduct of another person constituting a crime. Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring driving with uncorrected defective eyesight when unfit through drugs. Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring driving after a licence has by what is called "counselling medical grounds.

The Accessories and Abettors Act (24 & 25 Vict. c) is a mainly repealed Act of the Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any The natural meaning of "to aid" is to "give help, support or assistance to" and it will generally although not necessarily take place at the scene of the crime.‎Provisions still in force · ‎Case law. Jun 24, — This provides that whoever shall aid, abet, counsel or procure the Thus, while the definition of every offence will stipulate what the principal. The meaning of "aid, abet,counsel and procure" has been the subject of judicial To"aid"means to give help,support or assistance to at the time of the offence.